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Abstract
We investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative measures to increase standards in
low-income countries in a two-country framework where (a) trade and standards in low-income
countries are negatively related, and (b) free trade is no longer optimal for the high-income
country due to a negative psychological externality that low standards in low-income countries
exert. We find that any uncoordinated, unilateral action by the high-income country to decrease
the psychological externality is dominated by coordinated action; both with respect to the
psychological externality as with respect to the welfare consequences for both countries. Since
any increase in the standard in the low-income country decreases their welfare, co-ordination is
not always a feasible solution. Only when incorporated in the framework of the WTO,
co-ordination can be made incentive compatible and gives rise to a situation where free trade
again works to the advantage of both countries.
Keywords: psychological externalities, coordination, trade intervention.
JEL-codes: D62, F13.
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1 Introduction1
”As the angry confrontation erupted at the Seattle WTO meeting in late 1999, I found myself furious. Not at the
protesters, but at myself and my kind for having done such a rotten job of explaining in clear and compelling English
the power and benefits of globalization”2
As many economists recognize themselves in such an outcry it is worth asking the question
why economists are not more successful in convincing the opponents of globalisation.
Apparently, the protesters in the streets of Seattle had different things on their mind than the
standard textbook treatment of the benefits of international trade and investment. Therefore, to
be convincing, one should start with understanding the point of view of the opponents of
globalisation. In this paper we try to do so. We analyse the concern of anti-globalists that
increased trade might lead to lower (labour) standards in low-income countries. By positing that
this concern is based on altruistic preferences, a low labour standard in developing countries
bestows a negative psychological externality on people in advanced countries. This gives them
the incentive to improve the situation in other countries, for instance by launching protests
against further globalisation.
The psychological externality we see can be interpreted in two different ways. A first
interpretation is that people do not want to consume products that are made under ’undesirable’
circumstances. Their utility declines if they buy, for example, a carpet which is made by children
compared to one made by adults. They experience disutility by ’contributing’ to such a situation.
Essentially this is a problem of asymmetric information that is to be solved by providing
information, for example by means of product labelling (see Keyzer, 2002, for an overview). The
second interpretation is stronger and states that people do not only care when buying a product
made under unpleasant circumstances, but also care about the mere existence of the situation.
Hence, disutility in one country is a consequence of an undesirable situation in a different
country.
We argue that it is the second type of externality that moves anti-globalists. Think about
children sewing footballs; not only those who buy or use a football care, most people would
prefer to end such a situation.3 Or think of the horrifyingly low labour standards on the ship
demolition area on the beaches of Alang in India. The labour standards are notoriously low there
and obviously, not the users of these Indian services are most concerned by the situation; it is the
general public that is worried by the situation. In the remainder of the discussion we refer largely
to labour standards but the analysis is also relevant for other cases: for example for cases where
1 We thank Theo van de Klundert, Arjan Lejour and Paul Tang for valuable comments and suggestions. Berend
Hasselman is acknowledged for technical assistance
2 Tom Peters on the cover of Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000).
3 Whether this is merely paying lip service or an actual willingness to pay is difficult to determine, given the public
good character of better circumstances abroad.
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low-cost production techniques damage the (local) environment.
Though we think that it is obvious that people genuinely care about the situation abroad one
would like to go beyond the anecdotes mentioned in the previous paragraph. Indeed, a concern is
that the majority of the dismay about low standards raise is only protection of domestic interests
in disguise. To address this concern Krueger (1997) analyses the support in the U.S. Congress of
the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995 and finds that members of Congress representing
districts with relatively many unskilled workers, who are most likely to compete with child
labour, are less likely to support a ban on imports made with child labour. If protectionist motives
played a major role representatives from these districts would have been more likely to support
the act. This indeed suggests that altruistic concerns play a role. Whether domestic
considerations also affect the ”concerns” about standards abroad is an open question.
This paper uses a model to analyse psychological externalities related to standards, in
conjunction with international trade. The way we proceed in this paper follows Bagwell and
Staiger (1998).4 We follow them in using the simplest possible model of international trade and
expand it to allow governments in two countries to choose the level of labour standards.
Moreover, we introduce psychological externalities in the model. We examine the interaction of
trade and labour standards and then explore the different instruments the high-income country
can use to alter the situation in the low-standard country. One way to accomplish this is by using
trade reducing measures, as suggested by anti-globalists. The optimality of such a measure is not
clear beforehand, since the potential welfare gain due to diminished psychological externalities
may very well be more than compensated by lower gains from trade. This delineates the aim of
this paper. We investigate whether or not a reduction of trade indeed raises foreign standards, as
the anti-globalists seem to think. We investigate whether or not using trade-restricting measures
is optimal regarding the objective one wants to achieve, that is raising the standards in foreign.
As an alternative instrument a government could alter its own standard to manipulate the
standards in other countries. Governments could also decide to opt for coordination while
setting their standards.
This paper shows that (1) trade indeed leads to lower standards in the low income country.
The basic intuition is that raising a standard is more costly in a world with free trade than in a
world with countries in autarky, as some gains from trade are lost too in the former situation. (2)
As psychological externalities are important and trade indeed leads to lower standards in the
low-income country it is no longer guaranteed that free trade is desirable for the high-income
country. For the high-income country the gains from trade can be counteracted by the increase in
the negative psychological externality. As such trade is unfavourable for the high-income country,
but not for the low-income country! Result (3) is that attempts by the high-income country to
raise the standards in the low-income country lowers welfare in the low-income country! A
4 They address how domestic standards could be treated within the GATT, without referring to psychological external-
ities.
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corollary of this result is that the altruistic motives of anti-globalists lead to policy that turns out
’egoistic’. The intuition is that higher standards abroad come at a cost, a cost greater than the
benefit, as otherwise the low-income country would have raised their standards themselves.5
Finally, we show (4) that it is actually the WTO – the organisation blamed by anti-globalists for
thoughtlessly applying the free trade dogma – that provides a solution to overcome the negative
impact of result (1)-(3). The solution we propose is to expand the interpretation of the existing
reciprocity rule to ensure that no country lowers its standards below the autarky level.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly some related literature.
Section 3 sets up the model and discusses the interaction between standards and trade. Section 4
introduces the psychological externality. Policy options to reduce the externality are discussed in
section 5, whereas section 6 provides an extensive comparison of all options. Section 7 discusses
the incentives to cooperation and discusses the role we envision for the WTO. Section 8 provides
a discussion on the robustness of the results. Section 9 concludes.
5 It is well known that any distortionary or costly measures imposed upon the formal economy drive out workers to the
informal economy where standards are absent by definition; we make no use of this argument to derive our results.
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2 Literature on international coordination
This paper fits in the line of literature dealing with claims that differences in regulation ought to
be removed by international coordination in order to create a level playing field. This literature
takes subsequent market failures into consideration and explores the need for coordination.
Three types of potential market failures have been discussed extensively. First, there are domestic
externalities. The basic point is that if market failures are strictly national the best way to address
them is by nationally differentiated regulation. Efficient regulation reflects the national
conditions. These include tastes, culture, governmental and legal systems, educational and
physical endowments (Rollo and Winters, 2000). The fact that regulation must address the
national needs, means that regulation should differ between countries. This is put forward by
Robert Lawrence et al. (1996, p. 47): ‘If national tastes or conditions lead to different laws, the
playing field of international competition will not, and should not, be level’ The important point
made here is that diversity in standards is legitimate and desirable because characteristics of
countries differ.6 The second market failure relates to international externalities, think of the
greenhouse-effect, ozone-layer depletion, deforestation and over-fishing. Any activities by one
country that impose costs onto other countries that are not transmitted by prices in principle call
for coordination (see Leebron, 1996, and Cooper, 1994, for a general discussion).7 The third type
of potential market failure is international policy competition; international interaction leads in
some cases to inefficient policy making (see Wilson (1996) for a more extensive discussion).8
Due to the fact that costs of a policy can be imposed on other countries a policy ’race to the
bottom’ might result. An example relevant in the context of this paper is when countries can
influence their terms of trade with standards: Brown et al. (1996) show that if countries have the
market power to influence their terms of trade, by using standards, they have an incentive to set
standards either too high or too low. The intuition is that the cost of raising a standard in the
export sector is translated into higher prices which implies an improved terms of trade. This is a
worsening of the terms of trade for other countries and hence they bear part of the costs. Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) propose the following solution to this problem. Given the present local
standards, governments bargain over tariffs and the implied world price. These tariffs and the
local standards together imply some level of market access. If governments want to alter their
local standards after the negotiations, they must keep the market access at the same level. So if
they increase the access to their own market, they have the right to increase their tariffs. If they
decrease the level of market access, they must decrease their tariffs, to keep the level of market
access for their trading partners at the same level. If governments have this freedom, an efficient
6 Others making the same point include: Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996), Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996), Casella
(1996), Cooper (1994), Esty (1994), Hansson (1990) and Krueger (1995).
7 Whether coordination is actually desirable depends on the expected costs and benefits of coordination.
8 Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) are the seminal papers in this field.
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combination of tariffs and domestic policies can be implemented.
This paper takes a closer look at an international externality that so far received very little
attention, namely psychological externalities. Indeed, we are not aware of any formal analysis
addressing the issue of psychological externalities. In some cases reference is made to this type
of externality though in slightly different connotations. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996) refer to
this problem as ”the Question of Ethical Preferences” and Howse and Trebilcock (1996) as
”altruistic or paternalistic concerns”. The discussion in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996) is
however limited. They argue that the values concerning those experiencing the disutility are
often not universally recognised and culturally and income dependent. Moreover, it is easier for
strong (developed) nations to force its values on weak (developing) countries than it is the other
way round. Their final objection is of institutional nature. Countries can have objections to
numerous practices in other countries, and it is hard to establish which are legitimate and which
are not. The claims can therefore easily be driven by protectionist interests.
Without denying Bhagwati and Srinivasan’s concerns, we want to extend the discussion by
acknowledging that the altruistic or paternalistic concerns simply do exist. Hence, we do not
reject such concerns beforehand but we argue that the altruistic reasoning is fundamentally
flawed, as unilateral action imposed upon a developed country is actually lowering welfare in that
country. Our analysis shows that with psychological externalities there is a role for coordination.
Our finding that the WTO can play such a role, resembles the results by Bagwell and Staiger
(2001), but is clearly different: they argue that when a country alters its standard (read: market
access) it should be allowed to restore the market access by changing its tariff. We use the fact
that when a country changes its market access (read: standard) its trade partner may retaliate.
This paper limits the discussion to the psychological externality: the fact that developed
countries care about standards in the developing countries. We obviously do not deny that the
other concerns discussed in this section are important, like for example policy competition that
could lead to a race to the bottom (possibly between developing countries). Moreover, what we do
not do is take into account that the demand for standards in developing countries likely depends
positively on income, or that developed countries care about total welfare in developing
countries. Again, these issues are likely important, but extending the model we develop with
these mechanism obscures what we are after: how to deal with concerns people have about
standards in developing countries.
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3 Standards and trade
The Bagwell and Staiger (1998) model starts with a single country, called home. It focuses on a
single good x with price px . The consumption (Cx) of the good is given by the function
Cx(px) = 1− px , the production (Q x) by the function Q x(px, s) = (1− s)+ px .
9 In the production
function the parameter s represents the economy’s labour standard. This s lies between zero and
one, where s = 0 corresponds to a very loose standard and s = 1 to a very strict labour standard.
For the interpretation of the labour standard Bagwell and Staiger use the example of child labour.
If s = 0, there is no regulation regarding child labour. Children of any age are allowed to work. In
this case the production is given by Q x = 1+ px . If s = 1, child labour would be completely
forbidden. In this case production is given by Q x = px .
In autarky, the price level of x then becomes pAx = s/2. It is positively related to the standard,
since an increase in the standard limits the production possibilities. To return to the child labour
example, a rise in s means that children can no longer work. This increases the cost of
production, Q x shifts to the left and the price rises.
The economic surplus in sector x is the sum of the consumer and producer surplus. Here it
amounts to (2− s2)/4. Economic surplus therefore monotonically declines with the standard set,
with a maximum value of 1/2 at s = 0 and a minimum value of 0 at s = 1. As such, a labour
standard has only economic costs.10 From an economic point of view it is therefore best to set a
very loose labour standard as it maximizes economic surplus.
A labour standard also has a social value. For a society it is desirable to ban child labour, or to
impose certain minimum working conditions. Specifically, the government values an increase in
s at rate λ . When the government decides on a labour standard for sector x, it takes into account
both the economic costs and the social value of the standard. In autarky, domestic welfare then
consists of the sum of economic surplus and social value. Hence,
WAx (s) =
2− s2
4
+λ s (3.1)
The standard the government chooses is the one that maximises domestic welfare. In autarky,
this is accomplished at a standard of sA = 2λ . The welfare equals WAx (sA) = 1/2+λ 2 and the
autarkic price level is pAx = s
A/2 = λ . The superscripts indicate the type of equilibrium: autarky
(A), free trade (F), free trade with psychological externalities (P) etc.
When Bagwell and Staiger introduce a second country in their analysis, called foreign, they
assume that this country does not have any labour standards. For our analysis, it is useful to also
9 To keep on stressing that our analysis is partial instead of general equilibrium, we will retain the subscript x through-
out the analysis.
10 Bagwell and Staiger assume that the workers excluded from sector x cannot work in another sector of the economy.
So if they do not work in sector x, they do not contribute to the economic surplus.
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incorporate a foreign standard.11 We therefore assume that the production and demand structure
in foreign is exactly identical to that in home. Hence, C∗x(p
∗
x) = 1− p
∗
x and
Q ∗x(p
∗
x, s
∗) = (1− s∗)+ p∗x, with an asterisk denoting foreign variables. When also in foreign the
government attaches value to standards, the social welfare function becomes
WA∗x (s
∗) =
2− s∗2
4
+λ ∗s∗ (3.2)
where all variables have the same meaning as before. The labour standard which maximizes the
welfare of foreign in autarky is sA∗ = 2λ ∗. In our analysis we will assume that the government in
foreign values the social value of a labour standard less than the home government. That is, we
assume λ > λ ∗ ≡ ϕλ , with 0≤ ϕ < 1. This implies that in autarky the foreign standard is always
lower than the standard of home (sA∗ < sA).
We now turn to the question how trade affects the optimal standards set. In autarky, foreign
not only has lower standards than home, it also produces x cheaper than home:
pA∗x = λ ∗ < λ = pAx . When both countries engage in trade, home will therefore import x and
foreign will export x. The trading equilibrium is settled by the home import demand function
and foreign export supply function. These are, respectively,
Mx(px, s) = s−2px (3.3)
E∗x(p
∗
x, s
∗) = 2p∗x − s
∗ (3.4)
while taking into account that after trade px = p
∗
x ≡ p
F
x . The free trade equilibrium price (p
F
x ) is
equal to pFx = (s + s
∗)/4.
To determine the optimal standards for either country when there is trade, we derive an
expression for the gains from trade as a function of both countries’ standards. These gains are
defined by the area under the import demand curve and above pFx for home and by the area above
the export supply curve and below pFx for foreign
12. By symmetry of the import demand and
export supply curves, the expression for the gains from trade is equal for both countries and can
be expressed as
GFx (s, s
∗) = GF∗x (s, s
∗) =
(
s− s∗
4
)2
(3.5)
The gains from trade increase as the difference between the domestic and the foreign standard
increases. This is so because in our framework the basis for trade is the price difference between
countries, which depends on the difference in standards between countries.
The government has to take into account the effect of the standard on the gains from trade
when its sets the standard. This means that the introduction of trade changes the optimal
11 Bagwell and Staiger do not introduce a labour standard in foreign as they are only interested in the home standard.
As it will turn out, their analysis becomes a special case of ours.
12 Since the intercept with the vertical axis denotes the autarkic price as a function of the standard of each country.
That is, the intercept of the import demand curve is px = s/2, while for the export supply curve it is px = s
∗/2.
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standard. Given the expression for the gains from trade, the trade-ridden welfare functions of
home and foreign become
WFx (s, s
∗) =
2− s2
4
+λ s +
(
s− s∗
4
)2
(3.6)
WF∗x (s, s
∗) =
2− s∗2
4
+λ ∗s∗+
(
s− s∗
4
)2
(3.7)
When both countries set their standards simultaneously, and take the standard of the other
country as given, welfare maximization leads to the following set of reaction functions in
standards
s =−
1
3
s∗+
8
3
λ (3.8)
s∗ =−
1
3
s +
8
3
λ ∗ (3.9)
The optimal standard in home declines as the standard in foreign rises (and analogously for
foreign). The reason for this negative relationship between s and s∗ is the gains from trade, which
increase when the difference between standards increases.
The non-cooperative Nash trading equilibrium in standards is
sF = 3λ −λ ∗; sF∗ = 3λ ∗−λ (3.10)
Since λ ∗ < λ , the free trade equilibrium standard in home is higher than in autarky, while the
standard in foreign is lower13. The reason for this difference is related to the gains from trade.
For the autarkic situation, see (3.1), the marginal benefit of a change in s is the social value of the
standard λ , while the marginal cost is the decline in economic surplus by 1/2s. The standard is
set where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits, hence sA = 2λ .
When there is trade, however, a marginal change in the standard has a second effect: a
change in the gains from trade of 1/8(s− s∗). For home, this implies that upon the introduction
of trade the marginal benefits of a rise in s go up, while the costs remain the same as in autarky.
This means that it is optimal to set a higher standard. For foreign the effect is exactly opposite.
With the introduction of trade the marginal costs of a rise in the foreign standard rise, because
this decreases the gains from trade. So when foreign trades, it is optimal to have a lower standard
than in autarky.
Trade thus raises the standard in home and lowers it in foreign. This illustrates the claim in
Bagwell and Staiger (1998, p. 13-14) that ”countries will adopt more stringent labour standards in
the presence of import competition than they would choose in its absence.”. Among other
things, this implies that the anti-globalists may have in point when they claim that trade leads to
low standards in developing countries. Note, however, that these lower standards also bring
13 The autarky standards are, respectively, 2λ and 2λ ∗. Since λ > λ ∗ by assumption, (3λ−λ ∗) > 2λ and (3λ ∗−λ ) <
2λ ∗.
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welfare gains to foreign, as do the higher standards in home. Given the new equilibrium values
for s and s∗ it is easy to verify that trade leads to gains for both countries.14
14 This is facilitated by calculating the welfare levels in each country in both the autarky and the free trade equilibrium.
Making the relevant substitutions for sA, sA∗ in (3.1)-(3.2) and for sF , sF∗ in (3.6)-(3.7) leads to WFx (s
F , sF∗) = WAx (s
A)+
3/4(λ − λ ∗)2 and WF∗x (sF , sF∗) = WA∗x (sA∗) + 3/4(λ ∗ − λ )2. Since λ > λ ∗, it follows that both countries’ welfare
increases due to trade.
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4 Psychological externalities, standards and welfare
As alluded to in the introduction, a low standard in foreign might bestow a negative
psychological externality on the inhabitants of home. In this paper we assume that people in
home do not want the people in foreign to work below a certain threshold level of working
conditions. More precisely, we assume that the people in home want the standard in foreign to
reach a certain minimum target, say s¯. This is an absolute target because all workers have some
basic rights that must be fulfilled. Examples are minimum safety regulations and maximum
hours of work. As long as the foreign standard is not equal to the target, the welfare of the people
in home declines. And this decline is greater the worse the situation in foreign is. For example, if
the regulation regarding safety is closer to the target, the negative effect declines.15
We model psychological externalities by adding the term −1/2(s¯− s∗)2 to the domestic
welfare function. Consequently, total domestic welfare is given by
WPx (s, s
∗) =
2− s2
4
+λ s +
(
s− s∗
4
)2
−
1
2
(s¯− s∗)2 (4.1)
If s∗ < s¯, the surplus in home decreases. Only when s∗ = s¯, the surplus in home is not negatively
affected. The way we model the psychological externality is symmetric in the sense that also a
higher standard in foreign would lead to a negative impact on home’s welfare. In our analysis,
we will therefore only consider cases where s∗ ≤ s¯. Equation (4.1) also indicates that when the
standard in foreign is much lower than the target value, a small increase in the foreign standard
has a large positive effect on domestic welfare. This effect decreases when the difference between
the foreign standard and the target decreases.
The people in foreign are not concerned with the situation in home, so the welfare function
of foreign remains unchanged:
WP∗x (s, s
∗) =
2− s∗2
4
+λ ∗s∗+
(
s− s∗
4
)2
(4.2)
What is the effect of the introduction of psychological externalities on the labour standards in
home and foreign? In autarky, obviously none, since each country determines its optimal
standard in complete isolation. But also in the trading equilibrium there is no effect, since each
country takes the standard of the other country as a given. The reaction functions of both
countries therefore remain the same as in the free trade equilibrium without externalities. For
the optimal standards this implies that sP = sF and sP∗ = sF∗. When standards are set
non-cooperatively, the introduction of psychological externalities has no effect on the optimal
standards.
Psychological externalities do have an effect on home welfare, though (welfare in foreign
obviously does not change). To make this more concrete, we set the minimum target s¯ equal to
15 Alternatively, we could make it a relative target by relating it to the standard that prevails in home.
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the home standard in autarky, that is: s¯ = sA = 2λ . Since sP∗ = sF∗ < sA∗ < sA , the optimal
standard of foreign is below the target value and welfare in home is lower than it was in the
situation without psychological externalities. This holds true for both the autarkic equilibrium
and for the trading equilibrium.16 In autarky the psychological externality amounts to
−2(λ −λ ∗)2 < 0; in the trade equilibrium it becomes −9/2(λ −λ ∗)2 < 0.
16 Provided, of course, we assume that autarky only implies isolation in a material sense and not in an awareness
sense.
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5 Policy options and psychological externalities
To decrease the negative impact of the psychological externality on home welfare the standard in
foreign should increase. This implies that home will have to find ways to change the marginal
cost-benefit analysis of foreign such that it decides to have a higher standard. In this section we
explore three policy options for home in this respect. The first option is that home uses its own
standard to manipulate the foreign standard. This is a policy option since the costs for foreign of
raising its standard are related to the standard home sets via the gains from trade. The second
option is that home uses trade policy to affect foreign’s optimal standard choice. For given levels
of standards, a tariff will decrease the gains from trade, which makes the costs for foreign to raise
its standard lower. The third option is that home confers with foreign to lower the psychological
externalities. This requires a cooperative setting, which we approach by calculating the global
planner equilibrium in standards. To be able to compare the outcomes of these alternative policy
options — with each other and with the standard free trade outcome — we once more set
s¯ = sA = 2λ .
5.1 The home standard as policy instrument
To make the home standard an effective policy tool requires a setting where home has some
power over foreign when the optimal standards are set. Analytically, we investigate the
consequences of such a situation by making home the Stackelberg-leader in the game both
nations play. This implies that whereas foreign still takes the standard of home as given, home
knows that foreign acts this way and therefore takes foreign’s reaction into account when it sets
its own standard. That way, it can use its own standard to manipulate the standard in foreign and
to increase its own welfare.
To determine the new equilibrium standards, we substitute the reaction curve of foreign (3.9)
in the welfare function of home (4.1) and subsequently calculate the welfare maximising
standards of home and foreign. This yields
sSt =
18
7
λ + 8
7
λ ∗− 6
7
s¯ (5.1)
sSt∗ =
16
7
λ ∗− 6
7
λ + 2
7
s¯ (5.2)
This implies that the optimal standard in home is lower than in the Nash equilibrium, whereas
the optimal standard in foreign is higher.17 Thus, in order to raise the foreign standard, home
will have to decrease its own standard.18 To understand this, recall that when home decreases its
own standard, the difference between home and foreign decreases. Hence the gains from trade
17 Substituting for s¯ = 2λ , the Stackelberg standards become sSt = 6/7λ + 8/7λ ∗ and sSt∗ = 16/7λ ∗− 2/7λ . It then
follows that sSt− sP =− 15
7
(λ −λ ∗) < 0 and sSt∗− sP∗ = 5
7
(λ −λ ∗) > 0 since λ > λ ∗.
18 This situation refers to the ’race to the bottom’ argument, though the mechanism is clearly different from the policy
competition literature.
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decrease for home as well as for foreign. Because of this, the marginal costs of a rise in the
foreign standard decrease, while the domestic costs and the social benefit in foreign do not
change. Consequently, foreign finds it optimal to raise its standard. The psychological externality
decreases and home’s welfare increases.
In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, where the introduction of psychological externalities did
not make a difference for the optimal standards set, the optimal standards in the Stackelberg
equilibrium are dependent on the presence of psychological externalities. To see this, consider
the outcome of the Stackelberg game without externalities, which yields s
St
= 18
5
λ − 8
5
λ ∗ and
sSt∗ = 16
5
λ ∗− 6
5
λ . The optimal standard of home is then higher than in the Nash equilibrium,
whereas the standard in Foreign is lower.19 Without externalities, welfare in home is enhanced by
an as low as possible foreign standard (as is increases the gains from trade for home). Home
should therefore make the costs for foreign to raise its standard higher, which is accomplished by
raising the home standard. When home increases its standard, the marginal costs of increasing
foreign’s standard in the gains from trade component,−(s− s∗)/8, increases and foreign will find
it optimal to lower its standard. The introduction of psychological externalities changes this
situation, as it adds an explicit element for home to value a higher foreign standard. Depending
on the relative magnitude of the psychological externality, the logical policy action for home
might then be to lower its own standard. When s¯ = 2λ , this is clearly the case.20
5.2 The home tariff as policy instrument
Suppose that home introduces a tariff t ≥ 0 and define τ ≡ (1+ t)≥ 1 so that px = τ p
∗
x . The
trading equilibrium then yields p∗x = px/τ =
1
2
s + s∗
1+ τ
, the gains from trade for each country
becomes
(
s− τ s∗
2(1+ τ )
)2
, while the tariff revenue for home can be expressed as
(px− p
∗
x)Mx =
1
2
(s + s∗)
τ −1
τ +1
s− τ s∗
1+ τ
. The tariff-ridden welfare functions of home and foreign
therefore become (including psychological externalities in home):
WTx (s, s
∗;τ ) =
2− s2
4
+λ s− 1
2
(s¯− s∗)2 +
1
4
(
s− τ s∗
1+ τ
)2
(5.3)
+
1
2
(s + s∗)
τ −1
τ +1
s− τ s∗
1+ τ
WT∗x (s, s
∗) =
2− s∗2
4
+λ ∗s∗+ 1
4
(
s− τ s∗
1+ τ
)2
(5.4)
The structure of these expressions is the same as before, except for the final term in (5.3), which
depicts the tariff revenues for home. Moreover, the gains from trade part of both expressions
19 As can be calculated by deducting the free trade equilibrium standards from these Stackelberg standards. This
yields: sSt− sF = 3
5
(λ −λ ∗) > 0 and sSt∗− sF∗ = 1
5
(λ ∗−λ ) < 0.
20 By doing some standard calculus, it follows that home will increase its standard when s¯ > (5λ ∗− λ )/2. s¯ = 2λ
satisfies this condition, since λ ∗ < λ . For a lower target value of s¯, it depends on the relative magnitude of λ ∗ to λ
whether or not this condition holds. The farther apart λ and λ ∗, the more likely the condition is also satisfied for
s¯ < 2λ .
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now depends on the tariff. Indeed, when τ = 1, both expressions are identically equal to (4.1) and
(4.2), the welfare expressions of the free trade Nash game.
Calculating the tariff-ridden non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in standards yields
sT = T
[
(1+2τ )λ − (τ 2− τ +1)λ ∗
]
sT∗ = T
[
(τ 2 +2)λ ∗− τ λ
]
with T ≡
2(τ +1)2
τ 3 +2τ 2 +3τ +2
. The optimal standards are again independent of the target value s¯
and when τ = 1, the optimal standards become equal to that of the free trade Nash equilibrium.
To get insight how the introduction of a tariff alters the optimal standards, we differentiate sT and
sT∗ with respect to τ and evaluate this at τ = 1. It follows that:
dsT
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
5
4
λ − 3
4
λ ∗ > 0
dsT∗
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
5
4
λ ∗− 3
4
λ > 0 if λ ∗ > 3
5
λ
Upon the introduction of a tariff, therefore, the home standard always increases, whereas the
foreign standard increases if the social value attached to standards in foreign is not too low
(relative to the valuation of standards in home). To understand this, note that a tariff diminishes
the gains from trade, ceteris paribus, which makes it less desirable for home to have a high
standard. In home, this effect is countered by the fact that tariff revenue increases when the
home standard is higher. At τ = 1, the latter effect clearly dominates the former. For foreign the
terms of trade effect – lower gains from trade means lower marginal cost for raising the standard
– dominates, conditional on λ ∗ > 3
5
λ .21
5.3 Coordinated policy
The previous two policy options assumed that home and foreign set their labour standards
non-cooperatively. By taking unilateral action, home tries to increase the standard in foreign.
Another type of equilibrium a cooperative setting. We analyse such a setting by calculating the
central planner equilibrium. A central planner aims at maximising world welfare and
determines the optimal domestic and foreign standards accordingly. The standards this planner
sets may therefore not be optimal from an individual country’s point of view. In principle, it is
possible that to maximise world welfare, the welfare of one country increases, while the welfare
in the other country decreases. The typical solution to resolve this problem is income transfers
from the country that gains to the country that loses. If these transfers are possible, both
countries have an incentive to cooperate.
21 Technically, the slopes and intercepts of the reaction curves shift with higher trade taxes. The condition ensures
that the outward shift of the foreign reaction curve is sufficiently strong for s∗ to increase.
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The central planner maximises the combined welfare of home and foreign. Total welfare is
obtained by summing the welfare functions (4.1) and (4.2) to yield:
WWx (s, s
∗) =
2− s2
4
+
2− s∗2
4
+λ s +λ ∗s∗+2
(
s− s∗
4
)2
−
1
2
(s¯− s∗)2 (5.5)
Differentiating this function to s and s∗ leads to the following two optimality conditions:
s =−s∗+4λ (5.6)
s∗ =
4
5
λ ∗− 1
5
s +
4
5
s¯ (5.7)
The condition which determines the home standard is a negative function of the foreign
standard and a positive function of λ . The negative relationship between s and s∗ depicts the
gains from trade. The coefficient is larger than in the Nash situation because the planner also
takes into account the gains for foreign. The gains from trade now have a bigger impact on the
home standard.
A large part of the foreign standard now depends on the target standard s¯. This represents the
positive effect of a higher foreign standard on home welfare. Of course it also depends on the
social value of the standard, λ ∗. The foreign standard is still negatively related to the home
standard, due to the gains from trade effect.
The solution to this pair of optimality conditions leads to the following optimal standards:
sCP = 5λ −λ ∗− s¯ and sCP∗ = λ ∗−λ + s¯
These results can be interpreted as follows: if s¯ is high a low foreign standard is
(quadratically) costly for home and the planner thus chooses a relatively high foreign standard.
The signs for the λ ’s are intuitively clear.
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6 Comparing the alternative policy options
In the previous section we have seen that alternative policy options can be used to reduce the
psychological externality that the low standards in foreign bestow upon home. Now we address
the question which of these policy instruments is most effective in reaching that goal. We
thereby define effectiveness as the percentage change in the psychological externality a certain
policy option yields compared to the non-cooperative Nash free trade equilibrium. To facilitate
the comparison we set s¯ = 2λ and use λ ∗ = ϕλ , with 0≤ ϕ < 1.
Table 6.1 presents the level of psychological externality attained for each of the policy
measures and gives the percentage change compared to the free trade. For reference sake we also
include the optimal standards.
Table 6.1 Effectiveness of alternative policy measures
Optimal standards Psychological Change compared
home (s) foreign (s∗) externality (s¯ = 2λ ) to free trade (%)
Autarky 2λ 2λ ∗ −2(λ −λ ∗)2 −56
Free trade 3λ −λ ∗ 3λ ∗−λ − 9
2
(λ −λ ∗)2
Stackelberg 18
7
λ + 8
7
λ ∗− 6
7
s¯ 16
7
λ ∗− 6
7
λ + 2
7
s¯ − 1
2
[
16
7
(λ −λ ∗)
]2
−42
Tariff T[(1+2τ )λ ... T[(τ 2 +2)λ ∗... − 1
2
[(2+Tτ )λ − ... depends on tariff
...− (τ 2− τ +1)λ ∗] ...− τ λ ] ...(τ 2 +2)Tλ ∗)]2
Central planner 5λ −λ ∗− s¯ λ ∗−λ + s¯ − 1
2
(λ −λ ∗)2 −89
Since the effectiveness of the tariff measure is a function of the tariff, we cannot make a clear
conclusion on the effectiveness of the policy options. After all, when we derived the tariff-ridden
tariffs, we saw that upon inception a tariff typically raised the foreign standard. We therefore rely
on numerical analysis to get more concrete insight on the matter. Suppose, λ = 0.4 and ϕ = 0.8,
which implies that s¯ = 0.8 and λ ∗ = 0.32. Then we can calculate the levels of standards as a
function of τ . This is reported in Table 6.2, which gives the levels of standards attained and also
the impact on the psychological externality. As the table shows the psychological externality is
most reduced in the central planner’s equilibrium. However, the psychological externality is only
one of the elements in the welfare function of home. Typically, the reduction in the psychological
externality will come at the cost of other welfare components, for instance the gains from trade.
To get insight in the desirability of the different equilibria, we compare the welfare effects of the
alternative policy options. Especially the welfare effects for foreign deserve our attention. First,
because of the moral dilemma that might evolve when raising standard in foreign would imply a
welfare loss to foreign. Second, and related, because of the feasibility of the central planner
option: in order to get cooperation off the ground, the distribution of the worldwide welfare gains
in the central planner solution should be such that both countries improve upon their fall-back
position.
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Table 6.2 Numerical example of effectiveness of alternative policy measures
s s∗ change in
psychological externality
compared to free trade (%)
autarky 0.800 0.640 −56
free trade 0.880 0.560
stackelberg 0.709 0.617 −42
central planner 0.880 0.720 −89
tariff∗
τ = 1 0.880 0.560 0
τ = 1.1 0.901 0.572 −10
τ = 1.2 0.913 0.589 −23
τ = 1.3 0.917 0.609 −37
τ = 1.4 0.914 0.633 −52
∗At τ > 1.4 home becomes an exporter of good x.
The analytical results of the previous section show that each policy option has countervailing
effects. To analytically compare welfare levels turn out cumbersome, therefore we rely on
numerical analysis to derive total welfare effects.22 Using the same numerical example as above,
we present in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 the levels of the different components of the domestic and
foreign welfare functions, as well as the total welfare effect. Table 6.3 gives the results for home,
Table 6.4 for foreign. For future reference, we also include the outcomes of a policy option yet to
be discussed (row WTO+).
Concentrating on the final columns in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, we obtain the following insights. For
home the move from autarky to free trade does not increase welfare. This result, contrasting with
one of the classic results in economics, derives from the fact that, due to the opportunity to trade,
foreign lowers its standard and thereby increases the disutility it imposes upon home. The
Stackelberg policy obviously improves upon the free trade Nash equilibrium.23 The reduced
psychological externality, by a higher standard in foreign, comes at the cost of a lower standard in
home though (see the column on social benefit). Moreover, as is clear from Table 6.4, the
reduction in home’s psychological externality comes at the cost of foreign welfare. The gain in
the standard translates indeed into a higher social benefit in foreign but comes at a high
economic cost! Note that any uncoordinated policy by home lowers welfare in foreign below its
free trade level. Note, moreover, that home has an incentive to raise trade barriers (starting from
a free trade agreement). Finally, the coordinated solution derived by solving the planners
22 The appendix contains a comparison of the different element of the welfare function. These can easily be ranked
in terms of welfare levels.
23 Note that the Nash policy is in the choice set of home when playing the Stackelberg game.
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Table 6.3 Welfare effects of different policies for home
domestic social gains from psych tariff Total
surplus benefit trade externality revenue welfare
uncoordinated
autarky 0.340 0.320 - −0.013 - 0.647
free trade 0.306 0.352 0.006 −0.029 - 0.636
stackelberg 0.374 0.283 0.017 −0.017 - 0.642
tariff
τ = 1 0.306 0.352 0.006 −0.029 - 0.636
τ = 1.1 0.297 0.360 0.004 −0.026 0.005 0.640
τ = 1.2 0.291 0.365 0.002 −0.022 0.006 0.643
τ = 1.3 0.290 0.367 0.001 −0.018 0.005 0.645
τ = 1.4 0.291 0.366 0.000 −0.014 0.001 0.644
coordinated
central planner 0.306 0.352 0.002 −0.003 0.657
WTO+ 0.318 0.314 0.003 −0.013 0.649
Table 6.4 Welfare effects of different policies for foreign
domestic social gains from psych tariff Total
surplus benefit trade externality revenue welfare
uncoordinated
autarky 0.398 0.205 - 0.602
free trade 0.422 0.179 0.006 0.607
stackelberg 0.405 0.197 0.001 0.603
tariff
τ = 1 0.422 0.179 0.006 0.607
τ = 1.1 0.418 0.183 0.004 0.605
τ = 1.2 0.413 0.188 0.002 0.604
τ = 1.3 0.407 0.195 0.001 0.603
τ = 1.4 0.400 0.203 0.000 0.602
coordinated
central planner 0.370 0.230 0.002 0.602
WTO+ 0.398 0.205 0.003 0.605
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problem learns that joint welfare is (by construction) the highest. From these observations we
conclude that coordination is desirable.
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7 Coordination, incentive compatibility and the WTO
The central planner creates the highest welfare, taking home and foreign together. The question
is whether the two countries are able to agree upon cooperation? Obviously, income transfers to
foreign have to be made in order to induce them to cooperate (foreign’s welfare under free trade
is higher). A genuine interest in foreign standards is therefore to be realised by ’asking’ them to
raise their standard and to provide an income transfer, conditionally thereon. This is implausible
for two reasons: first of all, economists tend to believe that lump sum transfers are infeasible.
Second, and probably more convincing, foreign is not able to commit itself to the high standard
agreed upon by implementing the planner’s solution: after receiving the lump sum payment, it is
beneficial to defect by lowering the standard to the free trade level again (see Tables 6.3 and
6.4).24 Thus the time inconsistency makes it impossible for foreign to commit to the policy.
An alternative way to think about coordination is to give the WTO a role in standard setting
and facilitating and monitoring agreements. We think of this as follows: WTO guarantees free
trade (access to the market in home) but requires that a country does not lower its standards. We
dub this WTO+. Variations of this proposal, like including labour standards within WTO, are
often criticised. We, however, propose something much less drastic, as our proposal relates to the
reciprocity principle already embedded in WTO rules. A full discussion of the drawbacks of
including labour standards in WTO is beyond the scope of this paper but we provide a limited
overview of the arguments.25 The essence of the argument is that (1) the useful role the WTO
plays might be undermined if it is burdened with tasks that are more controversial and (2) there
is a ’slippery slope’ argument: once core labour standards are set and checked by WTO it might
be easily seduced to interfere with all domestic policy issues that somehow affect trade (read: all
policies, as it is hard to come up with policy that has no effect on the prices of tradeables).
We formalise WTO+ as follows:
sWTO+∗ ≥ sA∗ = 2λ ∗ and τ = 1
It is simple to show that the inequality is binding, hence foreign sets its standard at the autarky
level. Home sets the best (Nash) response:
sWTO+ =
2
3
(4λ −λ ∗)
24 To defect implies for foreign, at worst, returning to autarky. It is simple to show that as long as s¯≥ 2λ , autarky is at
least as good (for foreign) as the welfare outcome under the central planner for foreign (of course ignoring the transfer
as that has been received already in our thought experiment; it is a sunk benefit for foreign). To fully consider a multi-
round game is beyond the scope of this paper, but in a multi-round game defection is optimal if a finite number of
rounds is played. As the final round is analogous to the one-shot game described above, then – by backward induction
– defection is already optimal in the first round.
25 See Bagwell and Staiger (2000) for an elaborate discussion.
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One can verify that home sets its standard lower than in the free trade Nash equilibrium. The
final rows in the Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that this policy is the best in terms of joint welfare.26
Moreover the WTO+ policy is incentive compatible. For incentive compatibility, (1) both
countries ought to have an incentive to cooperate starting from the uncoordinated equilibrium
and (2) both countries should have no incentive to deviate from the coordinated
WTO+equilibrium. Let us start with condition (2). For this we need to compare the free trade
equilibrium under WTO+ rules with the relevant alternative non-coordinated equilibrium. Note
that for home the WTO+ is better than autarky and better than any tariff outcome (and free trade,
but this is irrelevant as home welfare increases with the tariff). For foreign the WTO+ scenario is
better than the situation with tariffs or autarky. WTO+ is worse than free trade but this is
irrelevant as in a hypothetical free trade equilibrium home will always deviate, likely by raising
tariffs27 as that raises home welfare. This threat is credible as WTO rules allow such a retaliatory
response to a change in foreign standards to rebalance the concessions under the reciprocity
principle. Exactly analogous reasoning ensures that condition (1) holds.
26 Of course the planner exceeds this welfare level. The analytical comparison with the other policy options is ham-
pered by the dependence of the various policy options on s¯ and/or τ . It is possible to show though that the WTO+
welfare in foreign is always higher than in autarky, but lower than under uncoordinated free trade. When s¯ = 2λ , we
can also show for home that welfare under WTO+ is higher than in autarky, but a comparison with uncoordinated free
trade gives inconclusive outcomes.
27 Returning to an autarky-like situation, by setting a prohibitively high tariff, could also be a policy option. Autarky
and a situation where trade is zero are however not identical as optimal standards set will differ. Details can be
obtained from the authors.
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8 Robustness
The model – or call it an example – used to derive the results serves to illustrate our reasoning.
The question is whether the results are robust to changes therein. We answer this question in
two different aspects. The numerical results and the set-up of the model are discussed. First, the
numerical results: after numerical testing these results show to be extremely robust, in the sense
of the ordering of the relevant welfare comparisons used in the previous section.28 With respect
to the modelling exercise more has to be said. We use a few basic ingredients whereby we
introduce several simplifications that can, in principle, be generalised to derive more general
restrictions under which our results hold. First, there are gains from trade; gains that increase
exponentially in the countries’ differences in production cost. This holds for most trade-model
specifications, it is merely saying that gains from trade look like triangles (not necessarily the
symmetric ones that follow from our demand and supply elasticities that equal unity). Second,
we have a specific functional form for the psychological externality that is quadratic with a
threshold level.29 We argue that both characteristics are plausible. At a certain level, better
standards in foreign do not make you feel better. Whether the Indian office workers’ desks are
cleaned daily or weekly does not really matter is what we argue, whether children work does!
That the marginal disutility of bad standards increases with lower standards is obvious when
thinking of children working at an ever lower age. We have seen that restrictions on s¯ play an
important role, as these essentially determine the weight of the psychological externality. Also in
a more general setting one needs to determine the relative weight of the psychological externality.
Finally, we abstained from using a general-equilibrium model. To do that the essential extensions
come down to modelling a second sector and a resource to finance home’s imports. To leave the
results unaffected the second sector in foreign should not contribute to the surplus; an informal
subsistence sector is what we have in mind. Home could pay for imports by either the
production of the second sector or by received interest payments on past debt of foreign (the
second sector could in that case be a non-tradeable producer).
All these extension complicate the analysis and deliver more general conditions. However, as
the results we derive show up in our restricted setting we believe it is possible to derive them
under some conditions in a more general setting.
28 We, however, obey in the numerical tests the restriction that λ ∗ > 3
5
λ and s¯ = 2λ .
29 In future work we intent to derive the psychological externalities from first principles.
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9 Conclusion
This paper uses a model to analyse psychological externalities related to standards, in
conjunction with international trade. We use a simple two-country, one-sector model of
international trade where differences in costs of production between countries solely depend on
the level of labour standards governments choose. We apply this model to a situation where in
autarky foreign, the low-income country, chooses a lower standard than home, the high-income
country. In addition, we assume that standards in foreign negatively affect the well-being of
home, as low standards in foreign bestow a psychological externality on home. When trade
commences, the gap between the standards of home and foreign widens, which increases
welfare in both countries due to increased gains from trade, but at the same time lowers welfare
in home due to the negative psychological externality. Free trade is therefore not necessarily
welfare improving for home, while it is for foreign, and home may opt for policy intervention.
In the paper we investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative measures home can
take to raise standards in foreign. We find that any uncoordinated, unilateral action by home to
decrease the psychological externality, such as imposing an import tariff or by altering its own
standard to manipulate the standards in foreign, is dominated by coordinated action. This is true
both regarding the extent the policy intervention reduces the psychological externality in home (a
measure of effectiveness), as regarding the impact on home’s welfare (a measure of efficiency).
Any policy action comes at the cost of welfare in foreign, though, as for them unconstrained free
trade is always optimal. This implies that coordination is not automatically incentive compatible.
When incorporated in the framework of the WTO, by slightly expanding the interpretation of the
existing reciprocity rule to ensure that no country lowers its standards below the autarky level, we
argue that coordination can be made incentive compatible and that the situation where free trade
works to the advantage of both countries can be restored.
For the discussion on globalisation and labour standards, our analysis implies that the
solution typically forwarded by anti-globalists — to reduce trade by imposing import restricting
measures — is by no means optimal. Though it will raise the standards in low-income countries
and thereby reduces the negative psychological externality bestowed on them, at the same time it
reduces welfare in the low-income countries. Ironically, the solution to this dilemma is in the
hands of the WTO, the organisation typically blamed by anti-globalists for thoughtlessly applying
the free trade dogma.
31
32
References
Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger, 1998, The simple economics of labor standards and the gatt, NBER
Working Paper 6604, NBER, Washington D.C.
Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger, 2000, Gatt think.
Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger, 2001, Domestic policies, national sovereignty and international
economic institutions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, pp. 519–562.
Bhagwati, J. and T. Srinivasan, 1996, Trade and the environment: Does environmental diversity
detract from the case for free trade?, in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, vol. 1, chap. 4, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London, England.
Bucovetsky, S. and J. Wilson, 1991, Tax competition with two tax instruments, Regional Science
and Urban Economics, vol. 21, pp. 333–350.
Cooper, R., 1994, Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy, The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C.
Esty, D., 1994, Greening the GATT, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C.
Hansson, G., 1990, Harmonisation and International Trade, Routledge, London and New York.
Howse, R. and M. Trebilcock, 1996, The fair trade-free trade debate: Trade, labor and the
environment, International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 16, pp. 61–79.
Keyzer, M., 2002, Culture and labelling.
Krueger, A., 1995, Trade Policies and Developing Nations, The Brookings Institution, Washington
D.C.
Krueger, A., 1997, Observations on international labor standards and trade, in M. Bruno and
B. Pleskovic, eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996, pp. 281–302,
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Lawrence, R., A. Bressand and T. Ito, 1996, A Vision for the World Economy, The Brookings
33
Institution, Washington D.C.
Leebron, D., 1996, Lying down with procrustes: An analysis of harmonization claims, in
J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, vol. 1,
chap. 2, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.
Micklethwait, J. and A. Wooldridge, 2000, A Future Perfect, Crown Publishers, New York, New
York.
Rollo, J. and L. A. Winters, 2000, Subsidiarity and governance challenges for the wto:
Environmental and labour standards, The World Economy, vol. 23, pp. 561–576.
Rollo, J. and L. A. Winters, 23, Subsidiarity and governance challenges for the wto:
Environmental and labour standards, 561-576, The World Economy.
Wilson, J., 1996, Capital mobility and environmental standards: Is there a theoretical basis for a
race to the bottom?, in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites
for Free Trade?, vol. 1, chap. 10, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.
Zodrow, G. and P. Mieszkowski, 1986, Pigou, tiebout, property taxation and the underprovision
of local public goods, Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 19, pp. 336–370.
34
Appendix A Welfare effects
To gain insight in the welfare effects, we present in Table A.1 the analytical results on the
individual welfare components. For each of the welfare components — domestic surplus, social
benefit, gains from trade and psychological externality — we indicate the ranking of the policy
options. The tariff option is excluded, due to its dependency on τ . The table is based on an
comparison of the analytical results in Sections 3 to 5 and is constructed for s¯ = 2λ . The results
can be derived by straightforward calculations. Calculational details can be obtained from the
authors.
Table A.1 Analytical ranking of policy options
Home
domestic surplus (1) stackelberg, (2) autarky, (3) free trade and central planner
social benefit (1) free trade and central planner, (2) autarky, (3) stackelberg
gains from trade (1) free trade, (2) central planner, (3) stackelberg, (4) autarky
psychological externality (1) central planner, (2) autarky, (3) stackelberg, (4) free trade
Foreign
domestic surplus (1) free trade, (2) stackelberg, (3) autarky, (4) central planner
social benefit (1) central planner, (2) autarky, (3) stackelberg, (4) free trade
gains from trade (1) free trade, (2) central planner, (3) stackelberg, (4) autarky
psychological externality -
These analytical results emphasize that each policy option has countervailing effects. For
instance, whereas for home free trade is best for the gains from trade, the social benefit and the
psychological externality, it is worst for domestic surplus. Alternatively, the Stackelberg solution
is best for the domestic surplus, but worst or intermediate for other welfare elements. Moreover,
note that since s¯ = 2λ , the home standard under free trade is the same to that of the central
planner, welfare items that only depend on the home standard are the same for both of these
policy options.
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